Jimmie's behaviour is not psychopathic in character. And this fits with the rest of the picture Dr R has of this ordinary schoolboy. On the other hand, Dr R still does not understand why Jimmie is aggressive.
Should he now enquire whether Jimmie may have some unconscious motive for his behaviour? Well, what are the reasons for the scepticism and opposition from certain traditional and mainstream quarters to such a probe? What are the logical troubles here? It is evident that, when the registrar initiates this probe, he makes two presuppositions. First, that the concept of an unconscious motive is a valid one. That is to say, it does really apply to items in nature; it is not a delusive notion. Second, that it may be possible to determine, with reasonable assurance in this particular instance, whether the concept applies or not. Are these two presuppositions justified?
Concept of an unconscious motive: its commonsensical character Consider the first presupposition. There is an assumption which is deepseated and widespread in medical and psychiatric circles, namely, that all psychological activity, whether ordered or disordered, is somehow the product or manifestation of what is going on in the body of the individual, and especially in the nervous system. To say that Jimmie's disorder is produced by a temporal tumour fits in with this widespread medical and psychiatric assumption. But to say that it is the manifestation of an unconscious motive does not fit in with it. We can identify the tumour; but we cannot do the same for any (alleged) unconscious motive. It-is this difference which may lead some psychiatrists to hesitate about using the notion, and to feel that, if they were to do so, they would not really know what they were talking about. What the mainstreamers really want here is that we should be able to spell out the biological mechanisms which produce and subserve the (alleged) unconscious motive behind Jimmie's violence. But of course, we are not able to do so at the present time. This fact, however, is very far from being sufficient to warrant traditional psychiatrists, or anyone else, rejecting the notion as invalid, and objecting to Dr R using it. The reason is that to reject the notion, for the reasons mentioned, carries with it intolerable consequences.
It is well known that the concept of the unconscious has been part of the ordinary common sense psychology in the West for a very long time indeed. Its place in our common sense psychology has been fairly well documented. It is in virtue of this place that we can say in ordinary life, for example: 'Smith simply cannot accept that he is deceiving himself'; or 'The two-year-old is being difficult because he is jealous of his baby sister'. If we are to reject the notion of an unconscious motive, and disallow the registrar from using it, then we must also exorcise it from our common sense psychology, and modify the latter accordingly. This is a consequence which we would not be ready to tolerate.
This carries with it a further consequence, which is equally or even more serious. Many concepts of common sense psychology have a reference which is not only dispositional, but also categorical in nature. Let me explain. Suppose I point to Smith, who is lying fast asleep, and say: 'You know, he believes in fairies'. Here I am saying, in part, that if Smith were woken up and asked about the matter, he would tell us that he believed in fairies; that if he took us up into the woods on midsummer's night, he would start to find traces of them, and so on. This is the dispositional side of my statement about Smith. But, when I point to Smith now and say that he believes in fairies, I am also saying that he has a belief in them. I am saying something about him which, I claim, is true here and now. This is the categorical import of what I am saying. But what is this that he has here and now? We obviously cannot pick it out via any biological machinery. If, then, we reject the concept of an unconscious motive on this ground, we will have to do the same for all the concepts of common sense psychology with a categorical import. We will only be able to save these by transforming them into ones which are purely dispositional in character. We will find it a very severe strain to remain within the restricted confines which our new dispositional notions impose on us: and we will find ourselves perpetually reverting to our presentday concepts, with their categorical references and their manifest utility.
It is evident, then, that the concept of an unconscious motive, which the registrar is tempted to apply to Jimmie, is to be found in common sense psychology; and it shares with many concepts of this psychology the fact that we cannot identify the biological machinery which subserves it. In this respect, the concept of Jimmie's unconscious motive is like that of Jimmie's beliefs. It is very commonsensical and ordinary.
There is a rider to this conclusion. It is generally accepted that, if we use the concept of an unconscious motive, we are using a tool which has considerable explanatory force. It helps to make much understandable, which is not understandable without it. If, therefore, we deny ourselves this concept, we restrict the explanatory forces of the discourse we use to speak about patients. We may then find ourselves talking a phenomenological, neo-Jaspers type of discourse (Jaspers 1923 (Jaspers , 1946 . We humans are all interested in how our fellow human beings tick. Discovering their motives, conscious or unconscious, plays an important part in this. Hence, if a consultant restricts himself to a discourse which excludes the concept of unconscious motive, and (let us suppose) only talks Jaspers-wise, then we must not be surprised if he sounds dull to his psychiatric trainees.
Concept of an unconscious motive: establishing its applicability What about the second presupposition which Dr R makes? When he starts probing into Jimmie's unconscious motives, he also presupposes that it may be possible to determine, with reasonable assurance, what the motive is. Is this true? That is to say, when Dr R posits unconscious motive X to explain Jimmie's behaviour, can he give us reasonable grounds to accept his posit? Or are we plunged into useless speculation -into assertion and counterassertion with no hope of a resolution? In other words, are we plunged into the sort of speculative exercise to which, by implication, Shepherd (1978) has sensibly objected?
Suppose, then, that Dr R puts out some probes, with the aid, no doubt, of his colleagues in clinical psychology. Suppose he collects information about Jimmie and his family which leads him to offer a narrative account of Jimmie's behaviour as follows: 'Jimmie's relationship with his father was never an easy one. He seems to have resented the great attention paid to his sickly younger brother, but he was always a very obedient boy and greatly respected his severe and discipline-conscious father. On looking again at his aggressive behaviour at school, it is possible to detect a pattern in it. He seems to attack, and to annoy older and bigger boys than himself. In the light of this new information, we suggest that he has a lot of bottled-up resentment against the father, which is now coming out in the form of his attacks on other children, especially older ones. It looks as if he would really like to have a go at the father; and he is having a go at his fellows instead.' This is a familiar type of story. In it Dr R makes use of some PD conceptsin particular, unconscious motive, defence by displacement, and repression. He posits a certain unconscious motive, namely, a wish to have a go at the father by hitting back at him. In order to posit this motive, he also has to apply the other PD concepts mentioned, of displacement and repression. The outcome is a familiar PD narrative. What, if anything, can Dr R do to establish, with reasonable assurance, that his narrative is true of Jimmie, and therefore that he has the unconscious motive ascribed to him? What can he do to convince the sceptics, when he is challenged?
It is evident that this PD narrative uses PD concepts to assert that a number of interconnected processes and states have occurred in the past in Jimmie's psychological system or mind.
These are, in an important respect, unobservable processes and states; and they are linked, causally and developmentally, with current unobservable states and processes, which are manifested in the observable behaviour of his violent, aggressive outbursts.
It would be generally agreed that there is one thing that Dr R cannot do to give us a reasonable assurance that his narrative about Jimmie is true. He cannot do what is done standardly by workers in the natural sciences when they are concerned to discover whether a hypothesis, which contains a concept about an unobservable, is true or not. They set about deriving observable consequences from the hypothesis, and related theory. If these consequences are found to be false, then this fact counts against the hypothesis. If the consequences are found to be true, then this fact goes to support or confirm it. Dr R cannot do this with his hypothesis and narrative about Jimmie; for the PD concepts which refer to unobservables are not specified in ways which permit the derivation of observable consequences. This is generally recognized. Therefore he cannot make the standard moves of natural science to confirm his own intrapsychic PD narrative and to disconfirm any alternative intrapsychic story.
But this limitation is not anything like as serious as it may seem; and it certainly does not put Dr R's story out of court. For the history of science contains some well known examples of explanations of the same logical sort, but which were later elaborated and specified in ways that allowed them to be verified and incorporated into science. We need only think of the atoms of Lucretius, or the gene particles of early genetic theory. In any case, Dr R would not dream of trying to support his narrative explanation in this hypothetico-deductive way, which is so characteristic of work in the natural sciences. This is simply not how he goes to work.
What, then, can Dr R do here? One thing he can, and perhaps would, do is this. He can suggest that the hospital try to help Jimmie in an obvious way, namely by giving him some psychotherapy which is PD-orientated, both in content and method. Then, if Dr R's explanation of Jimmie's problem is on the right lines, we can expect Jimmie to produce material in the course of his treatment which will bear out and so go to confirm Dr R's PD explanation.
Let us call this the defence or argument from 'subsequent movement or responses'. It is a very natural and tempting defence by Dr R; and it seems, prima facie, to be a perfectly legitimate way of supporting a narrative and a hypothesis containing PD concepts. Unhappily, this way of supporting the narrative and hypothesis about Jimmie takes us, and Dr R, into a sea of problems.
To begin with, can this defence succeed in proving or establishing conclusively that Dr R's account is correct? If Dr R is under the influence of Freud's early view of the matter, he may claim that this defence can do so. It can, provided that Jimmie's subsequent responses and conduct afford us good reason to claim that the treatment which was given him has been successful. If this condition is met, the proof of the correctness of Dr R's account is quite simple, and goes as follows. 'It is necessary for therapeutic success that Jimmie should obtain and arrive at correct insights into the pathogenic aetiology of his problem, and into the unconscious dynamics of his personality at the present time. The insights he arrives at, on the road to improvement and cure, are those which represent Jimmie's appreciation and assimilation of the account of his disorder that Dr R has arrived at, and uses in treatment. Therefore, Dr R's account or narrative is correct. In particular, Jimmie's violent behaviour has the unconscious motive which Dr R posited'.
In the bright spring days of psychoanalysis, this proof or demonstration may have carried some weight. Today, its weakness is widely recognized; and I doubt whether many analysts or PD workers rely on it. For what is the criterion of 'a correct insight'? No criterion is offered which is independent of therapeutic success. Therefore, the insights which are correct are those Jimmie comes to arrive at about himself in the course of his subsequent responses and his progress to improvement. But what grounds have we now for claiming that these are really correctthat the patient's subsequent responses are valid indicators of the truth about the patient? Obviously, for them to be valid, it is necessary that the activity of the therapist should not influence the patient's subsequent responses in ways which infect them with artefacts, or 'contaminate' them (to employ Cheshire's (1975) useful word). If it does so, in any way, then the proof of a PD narrative collapses. We cannot prove or demonstrate or establish conclusively that Dr R's story about Jimmie is true (Griinbaum 1984 , Farrell 1985b ). Now we have very good reason these days to believe that the patient's responses may be contaminated, in one way or another, and to some greater or lesser degree. It is not only that the patient is open to the influence of 'suggestion' (which is what Grunbaum emphasizes). It is rather that the personal interaction between patient and therapist is a very complex and subtle business, in which the therapist's theoretical orientation and perspective plays a role, and in which the whole method of PD therapy is liable, in various ways, to infect the patient's responses with artefacts (Farrell 1981) . Because of all this, it is wise for Dr R to be modest and cautious. He would be wise not to try to establish his PD hypothesis and narrative about Jimmie by trying to prove it on the basis of Jimmie's responses in therapy. The tie between his PD narrative and Jimmie's responses is looser than this.
Some limitations of PD material How much looser is this tie? Just what is the connection between narrative and responses?
How do Jimmie's responses support, or fail to support, Dr R's story about him? And where they do lend support, how weighty is this?
Suppose a parent says of his little son, Sam, that he is very jealous of his baby sister. If this is true, we would expect Sam to reveal his jealousy in the usual sort of ways. For example, if he thinks he will not be noticed, he is liable to frustrate and tease her; when she has her birthday he is likely to be very difficult, and so on. If these expectations are realized, then Sam's behaviour supports the parent's assertion about his son. If they are not realized, then Sam's behaviour throws doubt on the parent's remark. Likewise, Dr R's story about Jimmie generates an open range of expectations about Jimmie's responses. For example, if he is encouraged to give vent to his feelings about his father, he may do so; if he is allowed to attack verbally other father substitutes, he is liable to do so; and so on. If these expectations are realized, then Dr R's story is supported; if not, then it is not, and doubt is thrown on Dr R's story. In this way, Jimmie's responses can serve to confirm or disconfirm Dr R's story, and it all seems very commonsensical.
But now we face the difficult question. How strong or weak is this confirmation or disconfirmation? Let us consider confirming responses alone. It seems reasonable to suggest, as a first move, that the more implausible it is to explain Jimmie's symptomatic behaviour and his responses in any way or ways other than Dr R's, the greater the support his responses give to Dr R's story. And conversely, the less implausible another or other explanations, the weaker the support conferred on the story. It is also reasonable to suppose that the less Jimmie's subsequent responses are infected or contaminated in therapy, the more weight we can give them. And conversely. Now let us make further suppositionthat before the treatment has been going on for long, Dr R judges it appropriate to offer Jimmie the following interpretation, namely, that in hitting other bigger boys, he is really trying to hit his father and vent some of his anger at him. Suppose that Jimmie then bursts into tears, and starts to come out with his anti-father feelings. This is an example of a response from Jimmie which gives strong support to Dr R's explanatory narrative about him. For, given the disproportionate magnitude of the subsequent response, it is only commonsensical to suggest that the interpretation merely served to spark off or release the subsequent response. Since the interpretation was offered fairly early on in treatment, it is unlikely that transference feelings have been at work to infect and contaminate his responses to any great degree. All this contributes to make it difficult to explain Jimmie's responses in any way other than the one offered by Dr R. In this supposed instance, therefore, the patient's responses offer strong support to Dr R's PD narrative about the patient.
It is worth noting that Dr R's hypothetical interpretation here is an instance of one which satisfies a criterion of correctness suggested by Wisdom (1962) , which has been labelled the criterion of restricted response (Farrell 1981, and cf. Farrell 1976) . It is instances of this sort which Malan has been emphasizing recently and which, I think, lead him to claim, understandably but unwisely, 'that psychodynamics deal in observations from whicheven in a single case -inferences can be made that are virtually unassailable' (Malan 1979) . In other words, that in PD work one can have the experience that the truth has been revealed to one (Farrell 1983a) .
But, of course, Dr R will also be faced by many patients who are very different from Jimmie; and the responses they produce will have enormous variety, as we all know, and few of them will have the simple dramatic quality of the one we supposed that Jimmie produced for Dr R. Indeed, it is safe to say that most of their responses will probably not get anywhere near satisfying the criterion of restricted response or movement, as Jimmie's did. Because of this, it will be easier to explain these responses in other ways. Hence the support these provide for the connected PD narratives will be weaker also. This suggests that it may be convenient to think of us being faced by a complex spectrum or continuum. At one end, we have a PD narrative where the subsequent responses are like Jimmie's, and hence strongly confirm the narrative. At the other end of the continuum is a PD narrative offered about, and responses obtained from, a patient whose personality is still being (allegedly) reconstructed after years and years of psychoanalysis. It is doubtful what confirmatory weight or support, if any, his responses can give to a relevant narrative. However, the great majority of Dr R's patients, and their responses, will probably occupy other places in the middle range of this spectrum or continuum. What support their responses provide for relevant narratives will depend, in large part, on the logical features, which I have distinguished, of these narratives and their related responses. These features will differ in different instances. Therefore, while Jimmie's responses give us reasonable assurance that Dr R's narrative about him is true, other responses from Jimmie, and very many responses from other patients, will probably give us much less assurance about the truth and adequacy of the related narratives. This conclusion raises further questions, which I shall consider below (for some of the subtle complexities of this whole field, see Cheshire 1975).
Some peculiarities of PD generalizations and concepts
So far we have been concentrating on the material which Dr R gathers when he probes in a PD way. Let us now turn round and look at the theory which he uses, when he probes and explains Jimmie's behaviour in this way.
It is clear that Dr R does this by making use of some unstated PD generalizations. In particular, he uses generalizations connected with Oedipal development, and the generalization that seemingly motiveless aggression and violence may be a manifestation of the defence of displacement. The generalizations of PD are supported, primarily, by clinical material of the sort Jimmie produced when Dr R treated him in a PD way. As we all know, a great deal of clinical material of this sort has been collected in the pastand is still being accumulated at the present time. This material has gone to support a range of generalizations in PD theory. These are largely concerned, naturally enough, with the neuroses. And it is the strange character of a number of these generalizations which also goes to produce doubts about the status of PD theory, and about its value in psychiatry.
The generalizations we are considering appear to fall into two types, at least. (A) Those connecting early patterns of childhood experience with later conduct and difficulties. Professional workers are all too familiar with them. Dr R used some of them in his narrative about Jimmie. Here are a couple more examples: (1) If a child has an emotionally deprived upbringing, then s/he is liable to have difficulties in, or be incapable of, forming significant emotional relations in adulthood. (2) If a little girl has a close erotic relation with her father, she may be unable in adulthood to form a sexual relation with another man. It is worth noting that (1) and (2) may sound somewhat strained and awkward to PD ears. The same is generally true of other generalizations of this sort. PD workers tend to avoid giving these generalizations an explicit formulation (for reasons I shall ignore), and hence any formulation is liable to sound strained. But it is important to observe that, however strained they may seem, PDers cannot defend their central claim that the neuroses are importantly psychogenic in nature, unless they are prepared to formulate generalizations expressing psychogenic connections. Without such formulations, they have no psychogenic claim to proclaim or to defend. (B) The generalizations of the second type I pick out state the sorts of motives and defences at work in different types, of human disorder. Again, professional workers will be only too familiar with this type of generalization. A couple of examples (which may also sound strained) are quite sufficient to remind us of them. (1) If a person exhibits obsessional difficulties, it is very likely that the symptomatic behaviour plays a defensive roleby enabling the person to go on denying his unconscious hatred of a parental figure. (2) If a person exhibits a physical disability, for which no organic pathology can be found, then it may be that he is keeping some fear or anxiety out of consciousness by converting the emotion into the disability.
What, now, are the difficulties with generalizations of these two types, (A) and (B)? Notice, first, that the generalizations connecting past and present are not concerned, typically, to connect a past experience having a precisely specifiable set of properties on the one hand with later, or present, conduct having a precisely specifiable set of properties on the other. What the generalizations are typically concerned to do is to connect patterns of past and present. Now an instance of a pattern, or cluster, resembles other instances in such a way that the patterns can be said to belong to the same family, with a family resemblance between them. So a generalization typically connects one early family of experiences with another later one. Hence, the concepts used in these generalizations pick out patterns, which exhibit family resemblances between themselves. Hence they can be said to be family resemblance concepts.
Notice, further, that the key concept of defence is also concerned with family resemblances. When, for example, Dr R says that Jimmie's conduct is an example of displacement, Dr R has in mind a pattern of conduct, and he claims that Jimmie's conduct exhibits this pattern. This pattern resembles others which constitute the family of instances of patterns of displacement.
The fact that PD theory contains concepts of this sort may trouble many people; for example, the experimental psychologist, trained as he is to work with concepts which are operationally definable. But this feature should not trouble even the orthodox psychiatrist, with his biological training and interest in using natural science to place his own subject on a firmer foundation. For he also has a clinical background in medicine and psychiatry. Consequently, he is really quite accustomed to making and working with judgments about patterns of symptoms, and the family resemblances they exhibit.
These generalizations, (A) and (B) , exhibit yet another difficulty. They are not the universal ones we expect to find in natural science. They do not state that 'All As are Bs'; that is to say, 'If anything is an A, it is also a B'. They state that, for example, 'If a person has a certain pattern of early experience, P, then he is liable to, or likely to, or may exhibit later on a pattern Q of difficulties'. Elsewhere I have labelled these 'tendency generalizations' (Farrell 1981) . Now it does not follow that, because they are not universal generalizations, they are illegitimate or disreputable. Far from it. For they are open, in their own way, to rational confirmation and disconfirmation. The account above of the relation between narrative and material does something to exhibit the way the material confirms. To exhibit how it disconfirms would take us into the detailed nature of PD therapy, and this would take us too far afield for our present purposes. Furthermore, a case can be made for the view that tendency generalizations are much more prevalent in scientific enquiry than has been generally recognized. Indeed, it could be argued that we have just been wrong to think of the Laws of Nature as being paradigmatically universal in character. On the contrary, these laws are concerned to state the powers of things, including organisms. And such statements take the form of tendency generalizations (Bashkar 1975) .
The evidence which supports generalizations to types (A) and (B) has yet further limitations. Thus, in supporting a connection between a pattern of early experience and later difficulties, the material does not standardly establish that the connection is causal in nature. It does not establish, for example, that a certain type of Oedipal difficulty helps to produce later problems. All the material can do is to suggest that it does, and to support this suggestion, more or less strongly, in the way I have already sketched. The fact that the supporting evidence is limited in this way should not surprise doctors in the least, in view of the well known methodological problems involved in establishing a causal proposition in their fieldfor example, that smoking helps to produce lung cancer.
All this makes it quite clear that, with PD, we are not dealing with a theory of the type found in the natural sciences. If a psychiatrist carries round with him the assumption that it is only theories of this type that are legitimate and respectable, then he will be bothered by PD, and will be liable to be suspicious of it. But this assumption is a mistake. It is not the case that only theories of the type found in the natural sciences are rationally respectable. I do not need to elaborate this point. However, many psychiatrists also carry with them a further assumption, which is also apt to lead them into trouble with PD. They assume that the future of psychiatry lies in the sciences fundamental to itthose sciences which will help us to uncover the biochemical structures and processes which produce and subserve our human disorders. But these fundamental sciences are of the natural science type. Since PD is not this sort of animal, many psychiatrists may be inclined to view PD, and its possible value, with suspicion. But this suspicion is misplaced. As soon as we appreciate that PD theory operates with a psychological model which is biologically uninterpreted, we can also appreciate that there is nothing logically incompatible between using PD when appropriate, and also searching for the biochemical foundations of human disorders. On the contrary, the two avenues of work seem to be complementary (Farrell 1985a (Farrell , 1983b . There seems to be a fairly general and firm agreement that PD has played a helpful role in the past in the development of psychiatry. It is difficult to see why it should not continue to do so in the future, even if its contribution turns out to be small.
An answer to the original question: with implications Now let us return to a PD explanation of a disorder. Dr R explained Jimmie's behaviour by saying, in particular, that this was a displaced manifestation of an unconscious motive. We have seen that there is no need to be uneasy about what Dr R is referring to here. The ontology of a PD explanation can be elucidated fairly well. But can his PD explanations be established in practice with reasonable assurance? Or are they bound to be, and to remain, so speculative in character as not to be worth offering and attending to?
To this question, there is no one, a priori answer. Our examination of Dr R's explanation makes this clear. Whether it really will be possible in practice to obtain the material to establish some PD explanation with reasonable assurance will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. If we can, and do, obtain subsequent responses which satisfy, completely or approximately, the criterion of restricted movement (which are the sort of responses that Malan (1979) emphasizes), then standardly we have the evidence to give us reasonable assurance that the explanation is true. If we cannot obtain this strong supporting material for an explanation, then we can only show that it is plausible, to some degree, great or small. This is perhaps the fate of many, or most, PD narrative explanations. But if we cannot even obtain in practice such supporting material, then the PD narrative remains a piece of speculation. This is why I said that there is no one answer to the question about the epistemological standing of PD explanations. Indeed, it would be very surprising if matters were otherwise. For the standing obviously depends on the circumstances of the particular case, and the nature of the explanation offered.
This conclusion has several implications. It follows that there is no objection of a conceptual sort to offering an explanation of the type Dr R presented, and to exploring the matter as he did. Mainstream psychiatrists cannot produce a general objection of a logical sort to Dr R's enterprise. On the other hand, Dr R cannot claim in advance that it will be possible for him in practice to produce material which will give us reasonable assurance that his narrative is true. PD workers are not warranted in having any such a priori confidence. When we ask: 'How plausible has a PD narrative explanation to be before it becomes worthwhile taking it seriously?', the answer depends on a professional and personal judgment. This judgment can be guided, and no doubt should be guided, by rational considerations. But it is also open to reasonable and considerable differences of opinion between one psychiatrist and another. How worthwhile it is to explore a particular case PD-wise is, again, a matter of judgment in the light, in particular, of the consultant's and the registrar's familiarity with the relevant case material. However, it is as well, perhaps, for psychiatrists to bear in mind the overall state of their subject at the present time. It is in pretty poor shape (Farrell 1985a) ; so much so that it is advisable for them to be prepared to make use of any battery of concepts for which there are rational grounds, and which are open logically to incorporation within the corpus of scientific knowledge.
Eliminating politics One last point. So far I have been considering conceptual sources of current doubts about PD theory. I shall now speak briefly, and with diffidence as a complete outsider, about a matter which is not conceptual at allor only indirectly so, at most. I have the strong impression that, largely for historical reasons, PD is at the centre of a political controversy. There are many in the psychiatric profession in this country who regard PD as the ideology of a pressure group inside the professiona group working as a political caucus to extend the role, importance and power of the group. On the other hand, those who use PD are apt to view the mainstream of the profession as members of a traditional and conservative medical establishment. They see the establishment as being greatly concerned to maintain its intellectual stranglehold over the profession; and, in particular, to continue to impose its own criteria of legitimate and acceptable exploration and explanation in psychiatry.
If my impressions are right, then the implications are obvious. The search for knowledge and its application, in the interests of human welfare, should be a single cooperative enterprise. Political controversy inside this enterprise -is schismatic, and liable to produce much more heat than light. Consequently, it is liable to obstruct research and the development of knowledge, and hinder the development and 'application of therapies. Hence the political controversy inside psychiatry, between mainstreamers and PDers, strikes me, an outsider, as unfortunate and pathetic. It is obviously desirable that both parties to the political controversy should be aware of the relevant difficulties about PD and their precise nature; and more aware of them then they have been in the past. For greater awareness may do something to bring the political controversy to an end.
